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Fit for Purpose or Faulty Design? Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice 
on the Legal Protection of Minorities  
Anneleen Van Bossuyt1 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether the European Court of Justice (ECJ), even in the absence of 
explicit competences, could play a role in the creation of a European Union policy 
promoting the protection of minorities and thus preventing their social exclusion. 
Comparison is made with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) because of the cross-fertilisation between the two Courts.  
The author argues that there is a conspicuous absence in ECJ jurisprudence on the rights 
of minorities to their culture and identity, whereas the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this 
regard is progressive. In contrast, the ECJ takes the fore when it comes to the protection 
of the linguistic rights of minorities. 
In conclusion, the author argues that the ECJ is not fit for purpose, but that to speak of a 
faulty design is taking a step too far. 
I. Introduction 
“Europe is the Europe of minorities”.2 The EU can indeed be thought of as a patchwork of 
minorities.  
The Rome Treaty paid no attention to minority protection. However, it is my assertion that the 
EU should develop an efficient policy for minority protection, not only to fulfil its role as 
defender of human rights on the international scene but also to maintain stability within the 
EU itself. Neglecting the minority problem could be a destabilizing factor. In spite of this, the 
member states did not assign any explicit competence to the EU to take action on this 
sensitive issue in the Nice Treaty.  
This paper will examine to what extent the EU has, even in the absence of explicit 
competences, developed a policy for minority protection. This will be effected through an 
analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The choice to analyze 
the case law of the ECJ is not arbitrary. The ECJ has played a pioneering role in the sphere of 
protection of human rights by qualifying them as “general principles of Community law 
                                                 
1
 The author would like to thank Stanislas Adam, Kirstyn Inglis and Peter Van Elsuwege for their comments on 
an earlier version of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2
 Romano Prodi quoted in Hungarian News Agency, 15 April 2001 (emphasis added). 
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common to the Member States”.3 The question is whether it could do the same for the 
protection of minority rights.  
Account must also be taken of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), because of the cross-fertilization between the ECtHR and the ECJ.4 Moreover, the 
Council of Europe was the first international organization to develop treaty protection for 
minorities by creating the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM) in 1994 and embraces a larger territory than the European Union with substantial 
minority populations, for example, in the Balkans. It is interesting to scrutinize whether the 
ECtHR was able, on the basis of a general human rights instrument (the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)), to develop a consistent minority 
protection jurisprudence that could serve as an example for the ECJ.  
The length of this study does not permit an examination of all of the judgments of the ECJ 
and the ECtHR that are linked to minority protection or could have an impact thereon.5 
Therefore, the paper will concentrate on certain milestone judgments of the two courts where 
minority issues have arisen, in order to gain insight into their respective attitudes towards 
minority protection. Ultimately, the aim is to determine whether this overall approach to 
minority protection at EU level is fit for purpose, namely by leaving it to the ECJ to fill the 
legal gaps in the European treaties.  
                                                 
3
 ECJ, case 29/69, Erich Stauder, judgment of 12 November 1969, [1969] ECR 419, para. 7; ECJ, case 11/70, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, judgment of 17 December 1970, [1970] ECR 1124, para. 4. In this 
“jurisprudential chart” of fundamental rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) has “special significance”. ECJ, case C-299/95, Kremzow, judgment of 29 May 
1997, [1997] ECR I-2629, para. 14.    
4
 For an extensive analysis, see, for example, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, “A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, 
Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis”, 43(3) Common Market Law Review (2006), 629–
665. Our study examines only the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, since that Court has only a general human rights 
treaty (ECHR) as a basis. The question is if the ECJ can do the same on the basis of its own human rights 
doctrine. That explains why acts of non-specific minority instruments, like the opinions of the Advisory 
Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), are not taken into 
consideration.  
5
 For an extensive overview of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on minorities, see the contributions of Roberta 
Medda-Windischer, “The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, 1 European Yearbook of 
Minority Issues (2001/2002), 487–534; 2 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2002/2003), 445–469; 3 
European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2003/2004), 389–422; and 4 European Yearbook of Minority Issues 
(2004/2005), 557–597. 
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II. The Rights of Minorities to their Culture and Identity: Conspicuous Absence versus 
Progressive Presence 
One of the core interests for a minority is the preservation of its culture and identity. To sum 
up the view of the European Parliament, unwanted assimilation is to be denounced.6 Non-
discrimination in itself is regarded as insufficient for the effective integration of minorities. 
That is why the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the ECtHR in this regard will be discussed 
briefly, before analysing their jurisprudence on the substantial rights of minorities to their 
culture and identity.  
A. Non-discrimination  
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) introduced a general non-discrimination article in the legal 
framework of the European Union (Article 13 EC). It aims to combat discrimination and not 
to eliminate differences de facto. This implies that it cannot be a useful basis for measures 
aimed at the positive discrimination of minorities. Moreover, the ECJ has been very reluctant 
in accepting positive discrimination.7 However, Article 13 EC has served as a basis for the 
adoption of the so-called ‘Race Equality Directive’, designed to “combat discrimination based 
on racial or ethnic origin implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin”.8  
In the framework of the Council of Europe, Article 14 ECHR is the general non-
discrimination clause, explicitly referring to “association with a national minority” when 
enumerating the grounds on which discrimination is forbidden. This is not the place to 
analyze in detail the reach and scope of the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 
ECHR.9 The article has been of little practical relevance as concerns the protection of the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.  
                                                 
6
 European Parliament Resolution on the Protection of Minorities and Anti-Discrimination Policies in an 
Enlarged Europe (2006), para. 43.  
7
 See, for example, ECJ, case C-450/93, Kalanke, judgment of 17 October 1995, [1995] ECR I-3051.  
8
 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between 
Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, OJ L 180/122 of 19 July 2000. Certain member states, however, 
did not fulfil their obligations under this Directive. See, for example, ECJ, case C-320/04, Commission v. 
Luxemburg, judgment of 24 February 2005, OJ C 93/2 of 16 April 2005; and ECJ, case C-327/04, Commission v. 
Finland, judgment of 24 February 2005, OJ C 93/3 of 16 April 2005. 
9
 For an excellent analysis of the reach and scope of the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 ECHR, 
see Kristin Henrard, “The Impact of International Non-Discrimination Norms in Combination with General 
Human Rights for the Protection of National Minorities: the European Convention on Human Rights”, 
Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of National Minorities (DH-MIN), DH-MIN 
(2006)020. 
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It was only in July 2005 that the ECtHR found for the first time a violation of the principle 
against racial discrimination contained in Article 14 ECHR. The Court considered in Nachova 
v. Bulgaria that any evidence of racial verbal abuse used by law enforcement agents when 
using force against persons from an ethnic or other minority is highly relevant to the question 
of whether or not hatred-induced violence has taken place.10  
With the Nachova judgment, the Court confirmed its increasing attention to the specific 
problems of Roma (see below). Moreover, it also confirmed that certain forms of racial 
discrimination can even amount to “degrading treatment”.11 Since this is prohibited by Article 
3 ECHR, the Court examined the actions of states in this regard with heightened scrutiny.12  
However, the ECtHR remains demanding when it comes to the evidence required to prove 
discrimination and in scrutinizing the margin of appreciation of states. The Court always 
examines the case from the perspective of the individual application and not the overall social 
context. Statistics, for example, are not considered as sufficient in their own right to disclose a 
practice that might be classified as discriminatory.13 More substantive evidence is necessary. 
This became clear in D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, where the Court had to judge on 
the frequent practice in Eastern Europe of the placement of Roma children in special schools 
intended for children with learning disabilities who are unable to attend ‘ordinary’ or 
specialized primary schools. This case shows the potential tension between the “subjective 
experience and perception of the applicant as concerns the alleged violations and the 
(perceived) objective and quantifiable proof requested by the Court”.14  
 B. Substantial Rights  
To date, the ECJ has not had occasion to use the instruments at its disposal to explicitly help 
minorities to preserve their identity, except as concerns their linguistic rights. However, they 
are treated in the next paragraph for the sake of comparison with the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR.  
                                                 
10
 ECtHR, Appl. Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 6 July 2005, para. 
164 
11
 Ibid., para. 145. 
12
 Henrard, “The Impact of International …”, 12. 
13
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 57325/00, D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, judgment of 7 February 2006, para. 46. 
14
 Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, “The Limits of Pluralism – Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights with Regard to Minorities: Does the Prohibition of Discrimination Add Anything?”, JEMIE 
(2002) No. 3, 21. 
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The lack of judgments of the ECJ can be explained by the fact that the ECJ has never been 
confronted with a case concerning minorities’ culture and identity because there is no legally 
binding document in the European Union preserving these rights. In contrast, the ECtHR has 
a written human rights treaty to interpret (the ECHR). This might change should the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “Charter”) be furnished with 
legally binding powers,15 as the ECJ would thus be confronted with the matter of 
interpretation of its provisions. For example, if confronted with a question on the freedom of 
expression, as provided by Article 11 of the Charter, the ECJ could refer to the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR to interpret this Article in favour of minority protection (see below). However, 
it should be underlined that, acording to Article 50 of the Charter, the Charter is addressed to 
the member states “only when they are implementing Union law”.  
By comparison, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is carefully progressive. Especially since 
2000, the ECtHR has made use of the substantive provisions of the ECHR in support of 
minority protection. The ECtHR generally deals with minority protection when scrutinizing 
the margin of appreciation of states. 
1. The ECtHR on the Right to Respect for Private and Family Life 
One of the first set of judgments of the ECtHR on the right of minorities to preserve their 
identity was the judgments on the traditional lifestyle of Roma under Article 8 ECHR on the 
right to respect for private and family life. The first case was Buckley v. the United Kingdom 
but the Court did not develop the minority problem as such in this case.16 In subsequent 
judgments on the traditional lifestyle of Roma, the ECtHR reviewed its approach and the 
minority problem is explicitly dealt with. The case of Chapman v. the United Kingdom serves 
as an example.  
                                                 
15
 Today, the Charter can be qualified as a ‘soft law’ instrument because the European Commission and the 
European Parliament decided to scrutinize their proposals for compatibility with the Charter. See Article 34 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getLastRules.do?language=EN&reference=TOC; Communication from the 
Commission, “Compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Commission Legislative Proposals”, 
COM(2005) 172 final of 27 April 2005. The Court of First Instance (CFI) referred to it for the first time in 2002. 
CFI, case T-54/99, max. mobil, judgment of 30 January 2002, [2002] ECR II-313, para. 48. In the line of its 
reasoning on human rights, the ECJ concluded for the first time in 2006 that the Charter reflects “the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States”. ECJ, case C-540/03, 
Parliament v. Council, judgment of 26 June 2006, [2006] ECR I-5769, para. 38.  
16
 By contrast, the partly dissenting opinions of Judge Repik and Judge Lohmus do make central the fact that it 
concerns minorities when scrutinizing the “necessary in a democratic society” condition. ECtHR, Appl. No. 
20348/92, Buckley v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 26 August 1996, partly dissenting opinion of Judge 
Repik and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Lohmus. 
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The Court explicitly referred to the importance for a minority to maintain its identity, 
including the possibility to maintain a travelling lifestyle.17 To that end, state parties have a 
“positive obligation to facilitate the Gypsy way of life”.18 However, this obligation only 
implies that special consideration should be given to their needs and different lifestyles. It 
does not imply that states are obliged to make an adequate number of suitably equipped sites 
available to the Roma. This would be too “far-reaching [a] positive obligation of general 
social policy”.19 The Court left a wide margin of appreciation to states to fill in this positive 
obligation.  
The Court derived the obligation of state parties to take into account the special way of life of 
the Roma from the “emerging international consensus amongst Contracting States of the 
Council of Europe recognizing the special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect 
their security, identity and lifestyle”.20 The moderation of the obligation, on the other hand, 
derives from the fact that “the consensus is not sufficiently concrete for it to derive any 
guidance as to the conduct or standards which Contracting States consider desirable in any 
particular situation”.21 Nevertheless, the ECtHR made a clear statement in favour of measures 
to preserve the identity of minorities and thus attributed a cultural diversity of value to the 
whole community.  
The case law of the ECtHR on the basis of Article 8 ECHR is not limited to the protection of 
the traditional lifestyle of Roma. In Slivenko v. Latvia, the Court dealt with the family life of 
Russian-speaking minorities living in Latvia. According to the Court, to carry out removal 
orders without providing any possibility for taking individual circumstances into account is 
incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 ECHR.22  
2. The ECtHR on Freedom of Religion 
The ECtHR considers that state parties that do not recognize minority churches or refuse them 
legal personality, when the church is often central to the minority’s culture, are in breach of 
                                                 
17
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 27238/95, Chapman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001, para. 73. 
18
 Ibid., para. 96. 
19
 Ibid., paras. 96–98. 
20
 The Court refers to the FCNM in ECtHR, Chapman v. the United Kingdom, para. 93. It is interesting to note 
that reference is also made to the Resolution of the European Parliament on the situation of Gypsies in the 
Community and the fact that protection of minorities has become one of the preconditions for accession to the 
European Union (paras. 60–61). 
21
 Ibid., para. 94. 
22
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 48321/99, Slivenko v. Latvia, judgment of 9 October 2003, para. 122. 
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the freedom of religion (Article 9 ECHR). From the cases Canea Catholic Church v. Greece23 
and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova,24 we can learn that the 
ECtHR recognizes the plurality of religions in a democratic society but also the possible 
necessity to place restrictions on that freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and to ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected. However, when the state exercises 
its regulatory power, it must remain neutral and impartial because the maintenance of true 
religious pluralism is at stake. It is in this regard that the Court assesses the margin of 
appreciation of the state and the proportionality of the measures taken by the state.25  
In Serif v. Greece, the ECtHR also emphasized that a government, when confronted with 
tensions created by a divided religious or any other community, should not remove the cause 
of the tension by eliminating pluralism but rather should ensure that the competing groups 
tolerate each other.26  
These judgments make clear that it is not enough that people may believe what they want. 
States must allow the establishment of the necessary institutions and give them the necessary 
recognition in order that they may have effective freedom of religion. The Court supports the 
existence of different religions alongside each other and thus it fosters the preservation of the 
(religious) identity of minorities. It places the conservation of pluralism at the heart of a 
democratic society but avoids explicitly treating the minority problem as such. At the same 
time, the Court has given clear indications of the necessity to protect minorities or at least not 
to hinder them from preserving their identity.  
3. The ECtHR on Freedom of Expression 
The emphasis of the ECtHR on pluralism can also be seen in its reasoning on the right of 
freedom of expression, as laid down in Article 10 ECHR. This right concerns, for example, 
the right to publish books that reflect a minority’s ideas.  
In Association Ekin v. France, the ECtHR condemned the ban of the circulation, distribution 
and sale of a book as a breach of Article 10 ECHR because pluralism demands that freedom 
of expression is not only applicable to information or ideas that are favourably received or 
                                                 
23
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 143/1996/762/963, Case of the Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, judgment of 16 
December 1997. 
24
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 45701/99, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v. Moldova, judgment of 13 
December 2001.    
25
 Ibid., paras. 115–119. 
26
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 38178/97, Serif v. Greece, judgment of 14 December 1999, para. 53.  
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regarded as inoffensive but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Also here, exceptions 
to this right must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued” and “relevant and 
sufficient”.27 That is why a complete ban on the publication of a book, the screening of books 
before their distribution28 or a conviction for having published a book29 are regarded by the 
Court as disproportionate to the aim pursued and thus in breach of the right of freedom of 
expression.  
In Özgür Gündem, the Court found that freedom of expression even implies a positive 
obligation on parties to allow minority views and opinions to be expressed, albeit without 
imposing an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.30  
In general, according to the Court, it can be concluded that minority groups enjoy a broad 
degree of freedom of expression that might challenge state structures.31 It should be noted, 
however, that the emphasis that the Court has placed on the obligation of parties to regulate in 
a pluralistic way is not necessarily interpreted by the parties as a general obligation to take 
positive measures.   
III. The Linguistic Rights of Minorities: the ECJ to the Fore 
Language is one of the core elements of a minority’s identity and goes to the very heart of the 
notion of ‘United in Diversity’ of the European Union. Despite the lack of explicit 
competences, the European Union has committed itself to the preservation of linguistic 
diversity.32  
The situation is clearly different within the Council of Europe, the international organization 
that created the ECHR, regarding which the ECtHR ensures enforcement. The Council of 
Europe not only created the FCNM, the first ever legally binding multilateral instrument 
devoted to the protection of minorities, as noted earlier; in 1992, it also created an instrument 
specifically aimed at protecting minority languages, namely the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages (EChRML). The ECtHR has no power to ensure the 
                                                 
27
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 39288/98, Association Ekin v. France, judgment of 17 July 2001, para. 56. 
28
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 25781/94, Cyprus v. Turkey, judgment of 10 May 2001, para. 44.  
29
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 27528/95, Kizilyaprak v. Turkey, judgment of 2 October 2003, para. 40.   
30
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 23144/93, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, judgment of 16 March 2000, para. 43. 
31
 Geoff Gilbert, “The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
24(3) Human Rights Quarterly (2002), 736–780, at 761. 
32
 See, for example, Article 22 of the Charter; European Commission Communication, “A New Framework 
Strategy for Multilingualism”, COM(2005) 596 final, 3; and European Parliament Resolution on Regional and 
Lesser-Used European Languages (2001), para. B. The importance of the preservation of minority languages is 
always highlighted.  
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enforcement of these last two instruments, for reasons we will not elaborate on further.33 
However, it uses the articles of the ECHR to preserve the linguistic rights of minorities.  
In contrast to the aforementioned rights of minorities to their culture and identity, the ECJ has 
left its marks on the language rights of minorities within the European Union. It should, 
however, be noted that these judgments have been pronounced in the framework of the free 
movement of persons and the freedom to provide services. Concerning the former, this 
implies that these judgments cannot serve as an example for third-country nationals (since 
free movement of persons is linked to citizenship of the European Union) or nationals of the 
member states that entered in 2004 and 2007, since transitional provisions apply to them, 
restricting their free movement. On the other hand, these judgments could serve for so-called 
‘new minorities’ that have the nationality of one of the ‘old’ member states while exercising 
their rights of free movement.  
In Mutsch, the ECJ had to rule for the first time on the use of languages before national 
courts. A Belgian court referred to the ECJ for preliminary ruling in order to ascertain 
whether the national legislation stipulating that nationals residing in a certain region of the 
country may ask to have proceedings before a court in that region conducted in a specific 
language had to be extended without discrimination based on nationality to nationals of other 
member states.  
The ECJ did not address the issue of minority protection but focused instead on the 
importance of the protection of linguistic rights in the context of the free movement of 
workers. For the Court, the right of a worker to use his/her own language in proceedings 
before the courts of the host member state (under the same conditions as national workers) 
plays an important role in the integration of the worker. The Court qualified this possibility as 
a “social advantage” and concluded that national provisions adopted for the benefit of a 
minority may not only concern persons who are members of that minority and reside in the 
area where that minority is established.34 
The ECJ was confronted with a similar judicial problem in Bickel & Franz. However, in 
contrast to Mutsch, Bickel & Franz did not reside in the country where they were being 
                                                 
33
 For comments on the FCNM, see Marc Weller (ed.), The Rights of Minorities. A Commentary on the 
European Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005); for comments on the EChRML, see Francois Grin, Language Policy Evaluation and the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2003). 
34
 ECJ, case 137/84, Mutsch, judgment of 11 July 1985, [1985] ECR 2681, paras. 11–17. 
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prosecuted. The ECJ perceived a form of indirect discrimination because nationals of the host 
member state are favoured indirectly by comparison with nationals of other member states 
exercising their right to freedom to provide services. In line with the general case law of the 
Court, such a rule can only be justified if it is based on objective considerations independent 
of the nationality of the persons concerned and is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.35 Although the Court explicitly recognized that “the protection of such a minority 
[ethno-cultural minority] may constitute a legitimate aim”,36 it found ultimately that the rule 
was disproportionate.37 Regional language arrangements were thus overridden by the ECJ in 
the interests of Community law.  
The main implication of these two judgments is that special language rights (the right to use a 
minority language in criminal proceedings) provided by national provisions to residents of 
certain regions have to be extended to all EU citizens who find themselves in the same 
circumstances, i.e., whose language is the particular language of that region. However, both 
cases concerned communication with and before judicial authorities, being “non-scarce 
goods”.38 The question is whether this line of reasoning would also be followed in a case 
concerning language requirements regulating the access to resources such as workplaces.  
No possible solution can be found in the judgments of the ECJ on the requirement to have 
proficient knowledge of a (minority) language as a condition for access to employment.39 
After all, these cases concern the requirement of proficient language knowledge, whereas the 
Mutsch and Bickel & Franz cases concern the right to use a language. However, the Groener, 
Angonese and Haim judgements are interesting because they indicate how far member states 
                                                 
35
 ECJ, case C-274/96, Bickel & Franz, judgment of 24 November 1998, [1998] ECR I-7637, para. 27. 
36
 Ibid., para. 29. 
37
 Ibid., para. 31. 
38
 Briefly put, being goods that are readily available. See also Gabriel von Toggenburg, “The EU’s ‘Linguistic 
Diversity’: Fuel of Brake to the Mobility of Workers”, in Andrew P. Morris and Samuel Estreicher (eds.), Cross-
Border Human Resources, Labor and Employment Issues: Proceedings of the New York University 54th Annual 
Conference on Labor (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004), 677–723. 
39
 The European Union, as an employer, is also confronted with these problems. One of the conditions of 
becoming part of the reserve pool from which administrators are recruited is having a thorough knowledge of the 
language of the country of which you have citizenship. This can cause problems for minorities having the 
nationality of a certain member state but speaking another language as mother tongue. This was the case in, for 
example, Dálnoky v. Commission. Dálnoky, a Romanian national belonging to the Hungarian-speaking minority 
in Romania, submitted her application in the competition organized to constitute a reserve pool from which to 
recruit administrators with Romanian citizenship. One of the requirements was to have a thorough knowledge of 
Romanian. She contended that that notice was discriminatory against Romanian nationals of the Hungarian 
mother tongue and requested that, instead, “a thorough knowledge of one Community language” should be 
required. However, the president of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal dismissed the case, among 
others, for lack of urgency. See Order of the President of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, 14 
December 2006, F-120/06 R, not yet published. The case is now pending before the Civil Service Tribunal.  
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may go when requiring proficient knowledge of a (minority) language as a condition for 
access to employment.  
In Groener, the Court again found a way to avoid issuing a Community viewpoint on 
minority languages. Emphasizing that the Irish language is recognized in the Irish 
Constitution as the national language, the minority aspect does not arise and the case concerns 
a national language that is the first official language.40 The Court examined whether the 
linguistic requirements (knowledge of the Irish language) were justified “by reason of the 
nature of the post to be filled”.41 In principle, member states can adopt a policy for the 
protection and promotion of a language that is both the national language and the first official 
language. However, the implementation of this policy may not lead to an encroachment upon 
fundamental freedoms. This implies that the linguistic requirement must be applied in a 
proportionate and non-discriminatory manner.42  
Two questions remained unanswered after Groener: would the Court exclude support of non-
national minority languages? Second, when is a linguistic requirement proportionate and non-
discriminatory? The Angonese case provided the answers. The Court does not preclude a 
policy promoting and protecting a language, even if this language is not recognized as a 
national language.43 However, the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination 
preclude the imposition of any requirement that the linguistic knowledge in question must 
have been acquired within the national territory.44  
The Haim case, which bears no relation to minorities at first sight, contains a line of reasoning 
of the Court that could have importance for them. The Court argued that even persons whose 
mother tongue is not the national language must be able to speak in their own language with 
dental practitioners.45 This could be understood as a recognition by the Court of the fact that 
linguistic diversity is a means of an advanced level of social integration of a minority and 
especially—in light of the case—so-called ‘new minorities’.46 Implicitly, this could even be 
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 Advocate General Darmon recognizes that Irish is a minority language. See ECJ, case C-379/87, Groener, 
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understood as an encouragement to member states to create an effective minority language 
policy.           
The above examined judgments indicate clearly the position of the ECJ towards the language 
policies of member states fostering minority languages.47 However, they also reveal the lack 
of any coherent Union policy on minority languages.  
The ECHR contains few language rights. The few that exist concern procedural and police 
related matters and are interpreted in a “minimalistic” way.48  
The most interesting developments with regard to the language rights of minorities are made 
on the bases of Articles 2 (right to education) and 3 (right to free elections) of Protocol 1 to 
the ECHR. With respect to the former—and, more specifically, the protection of mother 
tongue education or education in the minority language—the first case to address the matter 
dates from 1968. In the Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of 
Languages in Education in Belgium,49 the ECtHR made clear that this provision implies no 
right to education in a particular language. What is important is that no unjustified distinctions 
exist; that is to say, discriminations that affect the exercise of the right enshrined in Article 2 
of Protocol 1, read in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR.50  
In Cyprus v. Turkey, the Court seemed to move away from its rigid stance, although the 
context in this case is particularly relevant. Even if the Court did not recognize a right to 
mother tongue education, it argued that if authorities assume responsibility for mother tongue 
education in primary schooling, they have the same obligation for the secondary school 
level.51 This is already a step forward in the protection of mother tongue education for 
minorities and might even be transposed to other situations in which minority groups are 
denied education in their mother tongue in circumstances where they had formerly enjoyed 
it.52  
In regard to the protection of the rights of (linguistic) minorities on the basis of Article 3 of 
Protocol 1, the ECtHR ruled in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerafayt v. Belgium that this provision 
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 Ibid., para. I.12. 
51
 ECtHR, Appl. No. 25781/94, Cyprus v. Turkey, judgment of 10 May 2001, para. 278. 
52
 Medda-Windischer, “The Jurisprudence of the European Court …” (2002/2003), 469. 
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does not create any obligation to introduce a specific system such as proportional 
representation or majority voting with one or two ballots.53 The conservative attitude of the 
Court can be ascribed to the falling back on the wide margin of appreciation it attributes to 
parties. The Court does not take into account the effect of this reasoning on the effective 
respect for the right to free elections.  
Like the ECJ, the ECtHR has also had to consider the legitimacy of linguistic requirements, 
not in the context of access to work this time but rather in terms of the right to stand for 
national elections. It is interesting to see how the reasoning of the ECtHR and the ECJ follows 
the same line. After having referred to the wide margin of appreciation of parties, the ECtHR 
concluded in Podkolzina v. Latvia that a party may require a candidate for election to the 
national parliament to have sufficient knowledge of the official language. However, the 
requirement must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to the aim pursued,54 whereas 
for the ECJ, the measures must be non-discriminatory and proportionate.  
This overview shows that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the linguistic rights of minorities 
is less substantive than the jurisprudence of the ECJ. The ECJ has come to the fore in the 
matter of the linguistic rights of minorities and plays an active role in the promotion of the 
protection of minority languages within the European Union. This should, however, be 
nuanced against the background of the cases brought before the ECJ. Since this Court has 
only been confronted with language problems, it is only logical that its jurisprudence is more 
substantive in this regard.  
IV. The Participatory Rights of Minorities: Opening to Explicit Recognition 
The right to participate in all aspects of the life of the larger national society is essential for 
minorities, both to promote their interests and values as well as to create an integrated but 
pluralist society based on tolerance and dialogue.55  
Since there exist no provisions in EC/EU law providing for the participation of minorities in 
public, social and economic life in the member states,56 there exist no judgments of the ECJ 
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on the participatory rights of minorities. However, a recent judgment could be the first step in 
the recognition of participatory rights for minorities. The ECJ had to ascertain in Spain v. 
United Kingdom whether there is a clear link between citizenship of the Union and the right to 
vote and stand for elections, requiring that that right always be limited to citizens of the 
Union.57 The Court held that Community law does not preclude member states from granting 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate to persons who have close links to them, other 
than their own nationals or citizens of the Union resident in their territory.58 It is up to the 
member states to decide whether they make use of this possibility.  
Even if this judgment does not explicitly refer to minorities, it is important for minorities. 
After all, so-called ‘new minorities’ rarely hold the citizenship of their state of residence and, 
as a consequence, are excluded from participating in elections.59  
The ECHR contains two provisions that could favour the participation of minorities. On the 
basis of Article 11 ECHR, which provides for freedom of assembly and association, since 
1998, the ECtHR has consistently confirmed its protective stance towards (political) 
associations with a minority focus by sanctioning refusals of parties to recognize or register 
such considerations. It did so for the first time in Sidiropoulos and others v. Greece. The 
Court refers to the limited margin of appreciation of states60 and makes clear that parties may 
not forbid the application of registration of an association because it aims to promote the 
culture of a minority.61 After all, pluralism is built on the genuine recognition of and respect 
for diversity and the dynamics of traditions and of ethnic and cultural identities.62 The Court 
held the same line of reasoning in subsequent judgments.63 However, it clarified in Stankov 
and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria that if there had been a call for 
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the use of violence or an uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic principles by 
the association, parties enjoy a wider margin of appreciation.64 
The ECtHR used the margin of appreciation, which it exceptionally interpreted in a broad 
sense in Gorzelik v. Poland, to deny a violation of Article 11 ECHR, although the party in 
question forbade the registration of an association that aimed, among other things, to promote 
a minority.65 Two conclusions can be gleaned from this judgment.  
First, the Court is more inclined to interpret the margin of appreciation in a broad sense when 
it comes to electoral matters because of their relevance to the institutional order of the 
parties.66 This goes especially for judgments on Article 3 of Protocol 1 on the right to free 
elections.67 After all, the Court argued in Ždanoka v. Latvia that this Article is seen as lex 
specialis.68 The Court recognizes that the standards to be applied for establishing compliance 
with this Article must be considered to be less stringent than those applied under Article 11 
ECHR69 in order to respect the internal institutional order of parties and because it has been 
cast in very different terms compared to that Article.70 That is why the Court, for example, 
judged that a residence requirement as a condition to vote does not violate Article 3 of 
Protocol 1.71  
Second, it was essentially the factual assessment that led the Court to its decision in Gorzelik 
v. Poland. That the particular circumstances of the country play an important role in the 
decision of the Court had been proved earlier in Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey.72 The 
long line of cases against Turkey in relation to the dissolution of political parties shows that 
the Court does not allow parties to take disproportionate measures such as dissolving political 
parties because of their anxiety about minorities and their quest to participate in public life in 
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order to protect their own identity.73 However, in Refah Partisi, the ECtHR did not find that 
Turkey violated Article 11 ECHR by dissolving the Islamic-oriented Refah, which called for 
the elimination of secularism and for its replacement with Sharia law. Because secularism 
constitutes a key constitutional and democratic principle in Turkey, the Court considered that 
the dissolution of Refah could be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.74  
V. Conclusion 
The examination of the jurisprudence of the ECJ on minority rights compared with that of the 
ECtHR shows that the ECJ’s hands are tied when it comes to augmenting minority protection 
in the EU and is therefore not fit for effective minority protection. Because of this limited 
room for manoeuvre, speaking of a faulty design goes a bridge too far.  
The ECJ is not fit for the purpose because it has refrained from taking clear stances on 
minority protection—for example, by defining a minority language as the ‘national language’ 
in Groener. Accordingly, the Court has avoided articulating the viewpoint of the Union on 
minorities.  
The restraint of the ECJ can be explained by diverse factors, such as the impact of its 
judgments, the diverse minority concepts and minority protection in the member states and 
the sensitivity of the issue. However, it is foremost explained by the lack of competences of 
the ECJ and, more generally, the different framework in which the ECJ and the ECtHR find 
themselves. First, the basic aim of European integration is economic cooperation and the 
development of the internal market, whereas the ‘core business’ of the Council of Europe is 
the protection of human rights. Second, the European Union has only attributed competences 
and a partly supranational character, implying that it can take decisions without the assent of 
all member states, for example, in areas where it has exclusive competences or where 
decisions can be taken with a (qualified) majority. That explains why the member states are 
reluctant to relinquish their powers in the field of human rights, especially minority rights, to 
the European Union. Moreover, some member states are not eager to give up the regulation of 
minority matters to a supranational government because they see this as a threat to state 
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cohesion. In other words, they fear the possible implications of decisions adopted by the 
European Union over their heads.  
The ECJ has to act within the framework of these limited competences of the European Union 
and even in the absence of competences in the field of human rights and as a consequence of 
instruments. The ECJ elaborated its human rights doctrine before any provision in this regard 
existed in the treaties, which was already seen as an extension of its competences. Providing 
minority protection would be viewed by the member states as going a step too far and could, 
in light of the limited competences, even be seen as ‘illegal’. The situation is different for the 
Strasbourg Court. That Court does not have its hands tied to the same extent as the ECJ, as it 
operates in a ‘classical’ international, intergovernmental organization, where no decisions can 
be made without the assent of the parties. Moreover, it has a written human rights treaty, 
which thus provides a different starting point. This mainly explains why the ECtHR, in 
contrast to the ECJ, gradually took some clear stances towards minority protection, such as 
placing positive obligations upon states to protect the rights of minorities to their culture and 
identity.  
The recognition of positive state obligations by the ECtHR is a first step in relation to an 
effective protection of minorities. Yet it is not all roses in the ECtHR. When a complaint is 
upheld, it is up to the party to provide adequate remedies—for example, a change in 
legislation. The ECHR does not, however, provide sanctions in the case of non-execution of 
its judgments. Moreover, the judgments of the Strasbourg Court in the field of minority 
protection are sometimes ambiguous and inconsistent.  
However, to speak of a faulty design after examining the jurisprudence of the ECJ on 
minority rights is to go a bridge too far. After all, in spite of it having its hands tied, the ECJ 
leaves the possibility open to member states to construct their own minority language policies 
and to attribute voting rights to minorities. Moreover, should the Charter obtain a legally 
binding character, the ECJ’s role in protecting minority rights in matters relating to culture 
and identity issues would be even stronger. 
The above argumentation shows that there are some major legal obstacles to overcome to 
create efficient legal protection for minorities in the European Union. However, apart from 
the legal aspect, assuming that the preservation of an ‘own’ identity is of vital importance for 
minorities and that they should be able to participate at different levels of society, an effective 
 18
minority policy should comprise two elements. First, the right to identity of minorities, be it 
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity. Second, making their integration possible 
while respecting diversity. The desired standard of protection should at least be that defined 
by the instruments of the Council of Europe. In that way, there would be no possibility that 
the Union standard could be regarded as an alternative standard.  
Let us hope that putting these elements into practice will make policy makers in the future 
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